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ABSTRACT
In a multiagent process management system the distribution of
work is achieved by negotiated delegation of responsibility for
sub-processes by one agent to another. The responsibility
delegation mechanism is based on a combination of estimates for
subjective and objective payoff measures. This leads to estimates
of the probability that one agent is a better choice than another.
The probability of delegating responsibility to an agent is then
expressed as a function of these probability estimates. This
apparently convoluted probabilistic method is easy to compute
and gives good results in process management applications even
when successive payoff measurements are unpredictably varied.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
1.2.1 I [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Coherence and
coordination, Multiagent systems.
General Terms




The responsibility delegation mechanism described is based on a
combination of subjective and objective payoff measures that give
estimates of the expected relative value in delegating
responsibility to one agent or another. This leads to estimates of
the probability that one agent is a better choice than another. The
probability of delegating responsibility to an agent is then
expressed as a function of these probability estimates. This
method defines one set of probabilities in terms of another. It is
easy to compute and gives good results in process management
applications even when successive payoff measurements are
unpredictably varied.
The method has general application to multiagent negotiation in
areas other than process management. For example in electronic
business agents place a subjective value on other agents that
recognises the value of those agents as business associates. The
way in which this subjective value measure is combined with
objective payoff measures enables an agent to express its
preferences on whether to place its business with a valued
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associate or to chance an offer from a less-trusted agent that
appears to present a more attractive deal.
2. DELEGATION
A delegation strategy is a mechanism for deciding who to give
responsibility to for doing what. If agent Xo wishes to delegate
responsibility then: first Xo announces a proposal to a focussed
subset of n agents in its community {XIo... .X. ....,Xn}, second Xo
receives bids from these n agents, and third Xo chooses an agent
from this set. The strategies considered here achieve this
indirectly by determining instead n probabilities {Pk·,Pj, ...,Pn}
where P, is the probability that the i'th agent will be selected, and
S, Pi = I. The choice of the agent to delegate to is then made with
these probabilities. By expressing the delegation strategy in terms
of probabilities, the agents have the flexibility to balance
conflicting goals, such as achieving process quality and process
efficiency.
Prt X, »] denotes the rank of agent Xi' Rank is "the probability
that agent X, is the 'best' choice of agent, chosen from
{Xk.,Xj ....,Xn}, to delegate responsibility to". A delegation
strategy is a set {PIo...,Pj, ... ,Pn} where S, P, = I. The delegation
strategies described here are determined by:
Pj = f( Pr(Xj») )
for some function f that preserves the constraint S, P, = 1.
The probabilities Pr(Xj») are calculated at the time at which the
delegation is made. They are based on various estimates of future
performance that are combined to give a single expected payoff
vector for each agent !l;. The payoff vector contains sufficient
information to estimate the probability that one agent is expected
to deliver higher payoff than another in some sense.
3. PAYOFF: {nj }
There are five measures for agent Xo. Three are: time, cost and
likelihood of success which are attached to all of its plans and
sub-plans. The remaining two are value and a delegate
parameters that are attached to other agents. Time is the total time
taken to termination. Cost is the actual cost of the of resources
allocated. For example, if an agent has a virtual document in its
'in-tray' then the time observation will be the total time that that
document spent with that agent, and the cost may derived from
the time that the agent-possibly with a human 'assistant'-
actually spent working on that document. [Note: cost here does
970
not refer to costs incurred by the plan-this is considered in the
eBusiness applications described in Sec. 7.] The likelihood of
success is the probability that a plan will terminate successfully
within its constraints. The value parameter is the value added to a
process by a plan. Each agent represents the perceived subjective
value of each other agent's work as a constant value for that
agent.
The three measures lime, cos I and likelihood of success are
recorded eVel)1 time a plan or delegation is activated for a goal.
This generates a large amount of data whose significance can
reasonably be expected to degrade over time. Rather than record
the raw data it is summarised using the geometric mean. Given a
set of observations {Obi} where obi is the most recent
observation:
n n
L ai-I _ obi / L ai-1
i=! i=l
is the geometric mean where a is some constant, 0 < a < I. If the
observations {Obi} for some parameter p are drawn from a
symmetrically distributed population then the geometric mean
gives a point estimate of the mean of the population mp:
n n
L ai-I _lobi - J..lpI / I aI-1
1=1 I~!
is a (geometric) estimate of {liP times the standard deviation of
irameter p, sp' Where the constant a is determined empirically.
We now assume that the parameters lime and cost are normally
distributed. This is "not unreasonable", and is highly desirable
because the geometric means may be updated with the simple
formulae:
J..lp = (l - a) obi' + a lipnew - -,... old
(Jp = (l - a) lobi - J..lpId 1 + a (Jpnew - a - old
with starting values mpinitial and sPinitial' The likelihood of
success observations are binary-ie "success" or "fail"-and so
the likelihood of success parameter is binomially distributed,
which is approximately normally distributed under the standard
conditions.
Finally, consider measurements of the delegale parameter for
each agent. This parameter is the pair: w\n is the amount of
work delegated 10 agent i in a given discrete time period, and,
w~ut is the amount of work delegated by agent i in the same
discrete time period:
delegatenew = (I - a) _ Wi + a _ delegate.j]. The two
~'1mponents of the delegate parameter are not normally
stributed and the standard deviation is not estimated. The
delegate and value estimates are associated with individuals. The
time, cost and likelihood of success estimates are attached to plans
and delegations.
4. RANK: { Pr(Xi ») }
A bid consists of the five pairs of real numbers (Constraint,
Delegate, Success, Cost, Time). The pair Constraint is an
estimate of the earliest time that the agent could address the
task-s-ic ignoring other non-urgent things to be done, and an
estimate of the time that the agent would normally address the
task if it "took its place in the queue".
The method described above estimates the probability Pr(A»B)
that one agent, A, is a better choice than another, B. It may be
extended to estimate the probability that one agent is a better
choice than a number of other agents. For example. if there are
three agents to choose from, A, B, and C. then for some tA in the
interval [0, I]:
Pr(A ») = Pr(A» B) Pr(A» C) +
tA_ [ min[ Pr(A » B). Pr(A » C) ] - Pr(A » B) _ Pr(A » C) ]
To proceed assume that: tA = tB = te = t:
I-d
t=-- where:q-d
d = [Pr(A»B)]r(A»C) + Pr(B»C)]r(B»A)
+ Pr(C»A)]r(C»B) ]
q = [ min[ Pr(A»B), Pr(A»C) ] + min[ Pr(B»C), Pr(B»A) ]
+ min[ Pr(C»A), Pr(C»B) ] ]
5. STRATEGY: {Pj}
Given a sub-process, an expectation of the payoff TIias a result of
choosing Xi from {X!, ...•Xi....,Xn} to take responsibility for it,
and of the probability PrtX: ») that Xi is the best choice. A
delegation strategy at any given time is a set S = {P1,.··.Pi,···,Pn}
where Pi is the probability of delegating responsibility at that time
for a given task to agent Xi chosen from {XI, ...X],..·,Xn}·
If community culture is to choose the agent whose expected
payoff is maximal then the delegation strategy best is:
{
~ ijXi is such that Pr(Xi ») is maximal
Pi =
o otherwise
The strategy best attempts to maximise expected payoff. Another
strategy prob also favours high payoff but gives all agents a
chance, sooner or later, and is defined by Pi = Pr(Xi »), The
strategies best and prob have the feature of 'rewarding' quality
work (ie. high payoff) with more work.
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Foreword
The AAMAS conference series was initiated in 2002, with the goal of providing a single, high profile, internationally
respected and recognised forum for research in the theory and practice of autonomous agents and multiagent systems.
The first AAMAS conference (AAMAS-2002. Bologna, Italy) attracted a remarkable number of submissions and
nearly 700 delegates, firmly establishing it a, the major event in the academic history of agent system, to date. We
expect that the 2003 conference, in the attractive and cosmopolitan setting of Melbourne, Australia, will build on the
successes and strengths of the 2002 conference. and will confirm AAMAS as a key event on the international
computing research calendar.
AAMAS-03 received 466 submissions, from 30 countries across the globe. The 33 members of the senior program
committee recruited 178 program committee rrernbers to handle the reviewing process. Each paper was reviewed by
at least three program committee members, with some submissions selected for publication a, full papers, and some
selected for presentation as posters. The acceptance rate for full papers was 24.7%: low enough to ensure high
quality, yet high enough to include a variety of topics and perspectives. The acceptance rate for full papers and
posters together was 56.9%. Full papers were accepted from 19 countries, and posters from 21 countries. This
proceedings volume includes full papers, and poster summaries.
The AAMAS conference is a merger of three highly successful related events:
• The Intemational Conference on Autonomous Agents (AGENTS);
• The Intemational Conference on Multi-Agent System, (ICMAS); and
• The International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL).
We trust that these proceedings will do justice to the rich scientific and technological heritage of these three founding
organisations, and we hope that you will enjoy reading the proceedings as much as we enjoyed preparing them
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